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W.: Trusts--Necessity of a Trust Res.

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

him. As a matter of policy courts are deterred from disinheriting
the murderer by the fear of forfeiture and corruption of blood.
But here the decision would affect the wrongdoer personally, and
it is therefore submitted that since the common law on the subject
is unsatisfactory, a statute regulating these cases would probably
C. A. P., JR.
be beneficial.

TRUSTS - NECESSITY OF A TRUST Res. - The A company organized the B insurance association for its employees. All employees contributed to the insurance fund, weekly deductions being
made from their wages. The money deducted was turned over to
B for investment. For some months prior to insolvency, A made
the usual deductions from the payroll, paying B simply by crediting the aggregate amount deducted to B's account on A's books.
Upon A's bankruptcy, B claimed a preference to the extent of its
credit on A's books on the theory that A was a trustee. The district
court's denial of the preference was reversed by the circuit court of
appeals on the ground that A was a constructive trustee.1 This in
turn was reversed by the Supreme Court. Herd, that the mere
failure to pay a debt will not give rise to a constructive trust.
2
McKey v. Paradise.
On strict trust principles, no other result could have been
reached. It is axiomatic that there can be no trust without a trust
res,3 that a debt is not a trust.4 What makes the case of interest,
therefore, is the fact that an appeal to the Supreme Court was
necessary for the reiteration of these settled principles.
In 1894 this statement was made by a New York court: "In no
case has it ever been held as yet that a party may by transferring
his property from one pocket to another make himself a trustee.'"'
Courts today do not admit that he can. If troubled by the rule
1 In re Grigsby-Granow, Paradise v. McKey, 80 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935).
2 57 S. Ct. 124 (1936).
They
3 " Trusts are not declared in vacuo because of a trust relationship.
Edisto Nat. Bank of Orangemust be predicated of particular property."
burg, S. C. v. Bryant, 72 F. (2d) 917, 919 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Marble v.
Marble Estate, 304 Il. 229, 240, 136 N. E. 589, 594 (1922); Govin v. De
Miranda, 27 N. Y. S. 1049, 1052 (1894); 1 BOGERT, TRUsTs (1935) 81; RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 74.
4 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 12.
r Govin v. DeMiranda, 27 N. Y. S. 1049, 1052 (1894).
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that a trust res is necessary they say that the party, when he transferred money from one account to another on his own books did so
as a convenient short cut to drawing out the money and then
tortiously commingling it with his own funds. Therefore, the court
looks to the actual transaction and not to mere evidence of it. 0
Some courts completely forget the necessary elements of a trust,
and finding one or more of these elements, declare a trust.7 From
this repeated misuse of the trust concept, one commentator draws
the conclusion that a trust device is but a stereotyped reason for
a result a court wants to reach.' Thus when a bank has collected
commercial paper merely by debiting the drawer's account, but has
failed to remit before insolvency, it has been held because of commercial convenience that the bank was a trustee.0 Might not these
same courts hold that there was a trust in the principal case because
it would be socially desirable to protect the savings of the laborer?
In effect that is what the circuit court of appeals did.10
Basing his opinion entirely on Central Trust Co. v. Bank of
Mullens," Arnold, in his criticism of the Restatement of the Law
6 Adams v. Champion, 294 U. S. 231, 238, 55 S. Ct. 399 (1935) (applied to
constructive trust). Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian-American Bank,
130 Wash. 33, 225 Pac. 825 (1924) ; ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1924) 49.
7 Paradise v. McKey, 80 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); Central Trust Co.
v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929); Central Trust Co.
v. Bank of Mullens, 109 W. Va. 119, 153 S. E. 145 (1930); In re Leigh's Rstate, 186 Iowa 931, 173 N. W. 743 (1919) ; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538,
27 N. E. 256 (1891); ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 27; M'Fadden v. Jonkyns, 1
Phill. Ch. 153 (1842); SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 36.
8 Arnold, .Eestatement of the Law of Tnusts (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 800, 818.
But see Swan v. Children's Home Soc. of W. Va., 67 F. (2d) 84, 88 (C. C. A.
4th, 1933). The court, though much in favor of P's cause, refused to torture
the transaction into a trust.
Note especially the English courts' use of the device to give effect to third
party beneficiary contracts. M'Fadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Phill. Ch. 153 (1842);
Gandy v. Gandy, 30 Ch. Div. 57 (1883); Harding v. Harding, 17 Q. B. Div.
(1886) (to give effect to unexecuted gift); WILLISTON, CASES ON CONTRACTS
(3d ed. 1980) 384.
9 Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929);
Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733 (1926), 47
A. L. R. 754 (1927); Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E.
379 (1924), 42 A. L. R. 742 (1926). Contra: Commercial Bank v. Armstrong,
148 U. S. 50, 13 S. Ct. 533 (1893); Heeker-Jones-Jewel Mill. Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922), 24 A. L. R. 1148
(1923); Citizens' Bank v. Bradley, 136 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510 (1926).
10 The circuit court of appeals found a constructive trust by reason of A 's
breach of obligation to make proper disposal of the payroll deductions. The
court emphasized the fact that in order to keep their jobs the employees had
to contribute to the association. That fact makes their position Oven stronger
than it would have been had their contributions been wholly voluntary.
:1 Supra n. 7.
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of Trusts, makes the bald statement that West Virginia does not
strictly adhere to the doctrine that there must be a definite trust
res."2 Perhaps the statement is too strong; this nontechnical use
of the trust principle has generally been limited to cases involving
the banking business. 13 However, in Sullivan v. Madeleine Smokeless Coal Co.,1 4 on fact almost identical with those of McKey v.
Paradise,the court did not question the finding of the receiver that
there was a trust, but limited its consideration to the question of
tracing.
F. W. L.
12 Supra n. 8.
13 See cases supra n. 9.
14 115 W. Va. 115, 175 S. E. 521 (1934).
-s Since the fund in this case was kept in the same account as the company's
general account, it is to be presumed that no money was taken from that
account and returned to it. If money was actually set aside as a fund and
then redeposited, the fund would not lose its character of a specific trust res
by mingling. The facts on this point are not clear from the printed report or
lawyers' briefs.
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